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Abstract Strategic control has recently been recognized to serve two purposes – to ensure that
strategy is implemented as planned and to shape strategy content during implementation. While
there are many analytical tools available for designing strategic controls that ensure strategy
implementation, there are no comparable tools available for designing strategic controls that shape
strategy content during implementation. This paper develops a framework for designing strategic
controls that shape strategy content during implementation. The paper also illustrates the
framework through brief case examples.
Introduction
Strategic control systems are among the most fundamental tools of management
because of their ability to allow managers to monitor performance and redirect
organizational action when necessary. Traditionally, strategic controls have been
thought of as systems that help implement strategies as planned. The rapid change in
business environments, however, has caused many to reconsider and expand upon this
traditional view.
Specifically, it has been recognized that even with the best available information,
strategies have to be based in part on assumptions about external conditions such as
demand and competition as well as internal factors such as the ability to perform and
integrate various activities (Schreyogg and Steinmann, 1987). If these assumptions are
wrong, then implementing strategy as planned will not lead to improved performance.
In addition, even if assumptions underlying a strategy are valid, environmental
changes can bring about new opportunities and threats that undermine strategy
(Ansoff, 1980). Consequently, strategic controls have lately been recognized to have
two roles – helping implement strategy and shape strategy content (Muralidharan,
1997).
Strategic control systems that play the two roles have been termed strategy
implementation control and strategy content control respectively. Despite growing
recognition of this expanded role, there is an imbalance in the attention that the two
roles of strategic controls receive. This is perhaps best reflected in the scholarly work
that addresses design aspects of strategic controls. While there are a number of
analytical tools developed for designing strategy implementation controls (see the
Appendix for a brief review), there is very little work in developing frameworks for
designing strategy content controls. This paper presents a framework for designing
strategy content controls, and illustrates the framework through case examples.
Strategy content control design
Strategy content controls are systems that shape strategy content during the course of
implementation. Since invalid assumptions and environmental changes are the two
main reasons that a strategy being implemented may have to change, the focus of
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strategy content control is on these two factors. Strategy content control therefore has
two elements. The first involves evaluating the validity of key assumptions underlying
strategy and changing strategy content to reflect new information and assumptions if
original assumptions are found invalid. The second aspect involves monitoring the
environment to detect changes that may undermine strategy and, if necessary, change
strategy content to reflect the new environmental conditions.
While all strategies are based on information that is known to be true (i.e.
knowledge) as well as assumptions about relationships and phenomena, the ratio of
assumptions to knowledge underlying strategies will vary (McGrath and MacMillan,
1995). Similarly, while environments of all businesses are subject to change, the rate of
change will vary across businesses. Since employing strategy content controls to check
assumptions and monitor environmental changes can consume substantial managerial
time and resources, it is advisable to design these controls to suit the particular needs
of an organizations’ strategy. In other words, it is important to decide how much
attention and resources to devote to each of the two elements of strategy content
control. It is this aspect of design that is portrayed in the framework shown in Figure 1
and discussed below.
The framework in Figure 1 shows four scenarios based on the ratio of assumptions
to knowledge underlying a firms’ strategy, and the extent of environmental change or
uncertainty that the firm faces. The usefulness of this framework depends on being
able to make reasoned judgments about the level of assumptions to knowledge and
environmental change. While the particulars for a firm may vary to some degree, broad
and useful generalizations can be made about the level of assumptions to knowledge
and environmental changes that a firm may face based on a preliminary assessment of
the firms’ strategy and environment.
For example, strategies that move a firm into unfamiliar domains such as







assumptions to knowledge than strategies that keep the firm operating within its
existing products, markets and technologies. Similarly, firms that operate in
mature industries and country markets are likely to face less environmental
change than firms operating in emerging industries and developing country
markets.
Each of the four scenarios in Figure 1 is associated with a recommended
combination of the use of checking assumptions and environmental monitoring. When
the ratio of assumptions to knowledge and the extent of environmental change are both
low (scenario 3), for example, strategy content control design that involves using
routine processes for checking assumptions and environmental monitoring is
advocated. When the ratio of assumptions to knowledge and the extent of
environmental change are both high (scenario 1), in contrast, “advanced” processes
for checking assumptions and environmental monitoring in addition to the respective
routine processes are recommended. For scenario 2, where the ratio of assumptions to
knowledge is low but the extent of environmental change is high, routine process for
checking assumptions along with routine and advanced processes for environmental
monitoring are recommended. For scenario 4, where ratio of assumptions to knowledge
is high but the extent of environmental change is low, routine and advanced processes
for checking assumptions along with routine process for environmental monitoring is
recommended.
Routine and advanced processes for checking assumptions
The routine process for checking assumptions involves identifying key assumptions
on which the strategy rests, collecting information during implementation to
periodically check the validity of these assumptions, and changing strategy to reflect
the new information and assumptions if original assumptions are found invalid. While
this process may be sufficient when the ratio of assumptions to knowledge is relatively
low, when the ratio of assumptions to knowledge is high a firm may need additional
processes to lower the risk that it may be too late before invalid assumptions are
uncovered by the routine process.
For example, when a firm’s strategy calls for its entry into a new line of business,
assumptions about the firm’s ability to make a product that is accepted and demanded
by customers will be critical. Information needed to check the validity of this
assumption may not be available until the product is designed, engineered,
manufactured and marketed. If the firm used the routine process of collecting
information to check the validity of assumptions during the normal course of
implementation, it may have to wait too long–until the products are designed,
engineered, manufactured and marketed. It may be too late for the firm to reverse or
correct its strategy by then. More advanced processes for checking assumptions may
therefore be needed to supplement the routine assumption checking process in such
cases.
Rapid results initiatives and phased sequential implementation are two
supplementary processes that are particularly useful. Rapid results initiatives are a
series of mini-projects that represent scaled-down versions of the strategy (Matta and
Ashkenas, 2003). Each of these projects are designed to produce measurable results
that are representative of results hoped for with the firms strategy, and are




initiatives replicate the expected implementation of the firms’ strategy in miniature
form and in a much shorter time frame, and hence will serve to expose assumptions
that are not valid in good time to take corrective action. These initiatives are similar in
spirit to concept testing or pilot testing for new products and design concepts, where
one or a few models are produced to detect kinks in design and engineering as well as
to gauge market response.
As an example of how rapid results initiatives work consider Johnson & Johnson’s
strategy for integrating quality assurance for two previously autonomous clinical
R&D units whose personnel were spread around the world (Matta and Ashkenas,
2003). This was a major undertaking that called for many initiatives such as
developing training standards and designing systems for standardizing previously
disparate automated reports. Each of these initiatives would unfold over many years.
Given the complexity of the strategy, there were many assumptions (including that the
initiatives will add up to produce desired results) whose validity may not become
known for a long time. To lower this risk, Johnson & Johnson used a number of rapid
results initiatives, each aimed at integrating smaller chunks of the overall quality
assurance process quickly in order to discover invalid assumptions. The discovery and
learning from these initiatives could then form the basis to reconsider and modify the
strategy for integration.
Phased sequential implementation aims to more quickly check the validity of
assumptions by implementing parts of the strategy in sequential fashion. Honda Motor
Co.’s strategy for its entry into the sports utility vehicle (SUV) market illustrates this
approach. Although Honda was a very successful maker of passenger cars in the US
market, the company lacked products in the profitable SUV segment. Entering this
lucrative segment required Honda to design, engineer, manufacture, and market a new
line of automobile significantly different from its passenger cars. This was a venture
requiring substantial commitment in resources and time. Honda’s knowledge in
passenger car design, engineering, manufacturing, marketing, and service, will have to
be supplemented with a number of assumptions regarding the SUV market. If any of
these assumptions, in any part of the value chain, were wrong then Honda could loose
substantial investments and risk the superior reputation it had earned in the passenger
car market.
Honda handled this problem by adopting the phased sequential implementation
process. Honda focused on marketing and service aspects of the strategy first by
outsourcing an SUV from Isuzu and reselling and servicing it under its own brand
name in 1994 (Bornhop, 1994). This meant that Honda could be in the SUV market
much faster and therefore check its assumptions about the market’s needs quickly.
Honda then incorporated what it learned about the market to design, manufacture and
market its own compact size SUV in 1997 and a larger SUV in 2003 (McCormick, 2002;
Visnic and Gardner, 1997).
Routine and advanced processes for environmental monitoring
The routine process for environmental monitoring involves scanning the environment
to detect changes in elements of the immediate environment, such as competitors,
suppliers, distribution channels and buyers, as well as aspects of the remote
environment such as macro economic, geopolitical, scientific, technological, regulatory,




through scanning will need to be assessed, and strategy changed to reflect the new
environmental circumstances. In most firms, scanning is done by line executives, who
collect and share environmental information on an ongoing basis, and the impact of
environmental change is discussed and strategy changes decided either periodically or
when major environmental changes are encountered. This routine process may be
sufficient when a firm’s environment is relatively stable. When the environment is
subject to more change, however, the frequency of changes and the impact of these
changes on strategy are likely to be significantly higher. Consequently, firms operating
in environments that experience, or are likely to experience, “high” levels of change
would benefit from adopting more advanced processes to supplement the routine
environmental monitoring process.
Advanced processes, to be effective, should reinforce and supplement information
collection, analysis, and the response phases of the routine environmental monitoring
process. Information collection can be enhanced by getting closer to sources of
environmental change, which will allow firms to obtain early warnings of impending
changes. For example, firms can become aware of impending legislative or regulatory
changes more quickly if they maintain an active lobbying effort. Similarly, maintaining
an active presence in technology consortiums can help firms recognize impending
technology related uncertainties earlier. Relative to the routine environmental
monitoring effort, these additional processes require firms to play a more active role in
seeking out information on potential changes early.
Utilizing advanced processes such as scenarios development (Schomaker, 1993) to
analyze potential impact of environmental changes can also be very useful to firms in
unstable environments. Scenarios development can help identify important sources of
environmental changes and thereby assist in directing and allocating environmental
monitoring resources and efforts. The identification of important sources of
environmental changes can also aid in preparing actions and responses to changes,
as discussed next.
Actions or responses, in the routine environmental monitoring process, focus on and
are typically limited to adapting strategy to environmental changes. Such a limited
response may be insufficient for firms in highly unstable environments because of the
frequency of environmental changes and the greater impact that such changes are
likely to have on strategy. Firms in such circumstances will need to buffer their
organizations from environmental changes by trying to shape the changes or their
timing. Examples of ways to influence and shape the environment include lobbying to
stall or modify proposed legislations and forming alliances and using selective
licensing to shape or settle battles for technology standards.
Illustration of the framework
This section provides a brief illustration of the framework highlighting factors that
help classify strategies into the four cells of the framework and some of the advanced
processes for environmental monitoring and checking assumptions. Figure 2 presents
four cases corresponding to the four design scenarios. Consider Disney’s strategy for
its theme park business in Honk Kong. Disney, in the late 1990s, announced a joint
venture with the local government of Hong Kong to build a theme park. Disney will
contribute $316 million for a 43 percent stake, while the Hong Kong government will




theme park will be located on reclaimed land in Penny’s bay on the Lantau Island of
Hong Kong and is scheduled for opening in 2005 (Benini, 1999).
The theme park business is familiar to Disney, which in the USA has operated two
of the most popular theme parks in the world. Operating a theme park in a different
land with different cultures and systems, however, is difficult and involves making a
number of assumptions. Disney’s previous international venture illustrates this well. In
1992 Disney entered Europe with its theme park in France. Given the relative similarity
of the European market to the US market, Disney expected a rather smooth startup and
operation. To its surprise, many of its assumptions had been wrong. For example,
Disney found that park attendance was 10 percent off from projections, per-person
spending was less than half of expectations, hotel occupancy was just 37 percent
compared to 97 percent in its US parks, labor costs were significantly higher than
expected, and Disney’s management practices were resisted strongly including legal
challenges to its dress codes (du Bois, 1994; Sloan Management Review, 1998). In
addition Disney found that Europeans bought a far smaller proportion of high-margin
items such as T-shirts and hats than expected from retail stores in the park, and unlike
US park visitors, Europeans did not “graze” food all day but flooded the park
restaurants at noon for lunch. The park restaurants, which were designed with the US
experience in mind, did not have enough seating capacity drawing the ire of visitors
and resulting in bad publicity (McGrath and MacMillan, 1995). Because of these
incorrect assumptions Disney suffered plenty in losses and reputation before the
venture was eventually turned around. China is an even greater challenge than France,
in terms of differences in culture, business practices, and political system.
Consequently, Disney’s Hong Kong venture is likely to involve a high ratio of
assumptions to knowledge.
With respect to the external environment, China is a developing economy with
massive potential but with many challenges. Unlike developed countries, economic
Figure 2.
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policy disruptions are more likely. For example, the Disney project faced possible
delays when a disagreement arose between the Hong Kong government and legislators
in 2001 over parts of the infrastructure outlays related to the Disney venture (Rogers,
2001). In addition, as illustrated by the recent and unexpected announcement by the
Chinese central government that it will have to approve any changes to Hong Kong’s
political system, political risk is likely to be high (Economist, 2004). Given
philosophical differences between the communist government of China and the US
government, geopolitical tensions between the two countries, over Taiwan for
example, could cause a backlash against Disney’s interests in Hong Kong. Competition
is yet another source of environmental uncertainty. While Disney is a giant among
theme park operators, it is not alone in the industry. Given the large and growing
demand for theme parks in Asia, other international companies such as Universal
Studios have been very active in the region scouting for locations to expand. Many of
these companies would want to position themselves in China to benefit from the surge
in economic activity and tourism that will accompany the 2008 Beijing Olympics.
Entry by Universal Studios into China to coincide with the Olympics, for example,
would siphon off visitors from Disney Honk Kong and undermine the economic
underpinnings of the project.
Thus, Disney’s strategy for Hong Kong, in addition to involving a high ratio of
assumptions to knowledge, is also subject to high environmental uncertainty (cell 1,
Figure 2). Our framework, for such scenarios, recommends the use of advanced
processes to supplement the routine processes for both checking assumptions and
environmental monitoring. Consistent with recommendations of the framework,
Disney is using the phased sequential implementation process to supplement its
routine assumptions checking process. Disney will implement the overall plan for its
Hong Kong theme park in two sequential phases. The first phase will include a theme
park, a number of hotel rooms, and a retail, dining and entertainment complex. The
second phase will include an additional theme park, and expansion to the
entertainment complex and hotel rooms (Emmons, 2001). Learning from the first
phase of implementation will be used to adjust and change phase two plans. Also,
consistent with recommendations of the framework advanced in this paper, Disney has
utilized advanced processes to supplement routine environmental monitoring.
Specifically, to deal with competitive uncertainty, Disney has held and announced
talks with Shanghai’s local government to build a theme park in that city by 2008
(Business China, 2002). This could be an effort to signal Disney’s intent to enter main
land China in hopes of dissuading rivals such as Universal Studios who might plan
their own entry into China in time for the 2008 Olympics. Also, by taking on the local
government as a joint venture partner in its Honk Kong theme park, Disney has
enhanced its ability to monitor and buffer itself against environmental uncertainties
stemming from political and policy risks.
Disney’s strategy for its US theme parks provides a stark contrast to Disney’s Hong
Kong business. Although Disney’s US market strategy involves a number of additions
and changes to existing attractions at its theme parks in Florida and California, these
are largely consistent with Disney’s technical expertise in a business context that is
very familiar to Disney (O’Brien, 2003). Consequently, the ratio of assumptions to
knowledge underlying this strategy is low. In addition, the stable business




industry suggests that Disney does not face high environmental uncertainty in its US
theme park strategy. Disney’s strategy for its US theme park business, therefore, is an
example of the scenario with low assumptions to knowledge and low environmental
change (cell 3, Figure 2). The framework recommends the use of routine processes for
both environmental monitoring and checking assumptions. Research using published
material on Disney’s actual practices suggests that, in line with these
recommendations, Disney uses just the routine processes for assumptions checking
and environmental monitoring in this case.
Intel’s strategy for its evolving wireless internet (Wi-Fi) business illustrates a
context where the ratio of assumptions to knowledge is low but environmental
uncertainty is high (Cell 2, Figure 2). Intel, the leading manufacturer of microprocessors
in the world, recently began marketing microprocessors with embedded wireless
transmitters. These microprocessors, trademarked Centrino, signal Intel’s entry into
the wireless internet market. The Wi-Fi chip market is fairly competitive, and
specialized firms such as Atheros, Broadcom, and Conexant presently hold leading
market positions. While Intel is a bit late to the market, most analysts expect Intel to
surge ahead given the relevance of its existing capabilities to this new product market,
its dominant position in microprocessors, and its strategy to embed Wi-Fi transmitters
within its microprocessors (Molta, 2004).
The technological standards for various Wi-Fi hardware that need to operate
together to provide a secure and seamless wireless experience, however, is still
evolving. The types of technological standards that emerge and whether they will
complement Intel’s own Wi-Fi chips are therefore critical environmental uncertainties.
Thus, while the requirements for creating and marketing Wi-Fi enabled processors are
well within Intel’s existing capabilities (suggesting low assumptions to knowledge),
environmental uncertainty is high.
Our framework suggests that, in this context, routine process for checking
assumptions is sufficient but there is a need for advanced environmental monitoring
processes to supplement routine environmental monitoring. Consistent with this
recommendation, Intel is using advanced processes to supplement routine
environmental monitoring. Specifically, Intel has actively sought to influence the
development of related technologies and products that will complement its own Wi-Fi
product. Through its Intel communications fund, Intel announced that it would allocate
$150 million to fund firms pursuing technologies and products that are related and
complementary to its own WiFi offerings (Electronic News, 2003). Mark Christensen,
Intel’s Vice President and Director of Intel Capital’s communications sector articulated
the rationale for these investments as follows:
These investments are part of Intel’s efforts to help accelerate the deployment of high-speed
wireless networks worldwide . . . The products and services these companies provide will
complement Intel Centrino mobile technology, which debuts March 12. These companies
represent the ecosystem of Wi-Fi companies that will make widespread adoption of wireless
broadband a reality (Electronic News, 2003).
While Intel appears to have assessed the uncertainty about technology and
complementary products well, it appears to have been surprised by uncertainty from
another source. Despite Intel’s growing investments in, and dependence on, the
developing country market of China, and China’s track record of pressuring high




corporations, Intel did not share the concerns of many on intellectual property
protection in China (Pfeiffer, 2002). However, in November 2003, citing problems with
security, China mandated that firms selling Wi-Fi chips there will need to incorporate
China’s own proprietary encryption standard and that foreign chip makers will have to
team up with one of 24 domestic partners to ensure that their chips incorporate the new
standard by June 1, 2004 (Edwards et al., 2004). This would mean that Intel and other
foreign firms would have to share their intellectual property with one of 24 domestic
firms – a prospect that has made Wi-Fi providers nervous (Edwards et al., 2004).
Despite lobbying through the semiconductor industry association, and intervention
from the US government, the issue remained unresolved by the June 1 deadline set by
China. Intel, in March 2004, citing various technical reasons and concerns including the
need to share intellectual property, announced that it will be unable to meet the June
2004 deadline to comply with the new policy, and that it does not have either a schedule
or a roadmap to produce such products (Davis, 2004). This, in effect, has locked out
Intel’s Centrino chip from the important Chinese market. Our strategic control
framework suggests that, as a developing country, China is likely to be an environment
with high uncertainties. Indeed, closer study of China’s policies in other high
technology industries such as cellular phones and DVD players will have indicated
that China may have concerns with wireless standards, and therefore, Chinese
government policies were indeed a potential source of environmental uncertainty
(Edwards et al., 2004; Kessler, 2004). This in turn, our framework suggests, should
have prompted Wi-Fi vendors such as Intel to work with China early on to address any
legitimate national security concerns in a manner that will also address the intellectual
property concerns of foreign firms. Such an advanced process of environmental
monitoring may have prevented the disruption that Intel has experienced in its Wi-Fi
business as a result of China’s new encryption policy.
Home Depot’s strategy for expanding its product markets offers an example of
strategy in cell 4 of our framework. Home Depot is the largest retailer of home
improvement products in the USA. The company has revolutionized the industry with
their unparalleled selection of products (over 30,000) in large warehouse type stores,
which also provide “do-it-yourself” customers with help and in-store clinics to develop
their home improvement skills. While this business has been very successful for Home
Depot, the company has looked to expand beyond home improvement stores to sustain
rapid growth (Gibbs, 1997; Wilensky, 1995). Home Depot’s expansion has focused on
related businesses in more specialized product categories such as home furnishings
and supplies for professional builders and contractors.
Home Depot’s product market expansion is limited to the US market, which is a
rather stable environment for the industry. Although the related nature of the
businesses into which Home Depot is expanding renders some of the company’s
experience and knowledge relevant, the strategy also rests on many critical
assumptions. For example, will the large square foot stores that the company is
experienced with lend themselves to the new product markets? Will the warehouse
style merchandizing work for the more specialty items such as home furnishings?
Could these new businesses cannibalize sales and customer traffic from the company’s
more general home improvement stores? Are the types of locations in which the
company builds home improvement stores appropriate for the more specialized stores?




the traditional home improvement stores? Would these specialty stores complement or
corrupt the brand identity of the original home improvement business?
Given the low environmental uncertainty and the high assumptions to knowledge
underlying the strategy, our framework recommends using routine environmental
monitoring process but supplementing the routine assumptions checking process with
advanced processes. Consistent with our recommendations, Home Depot uses a version
of the rapid results initiative. Home Depot’s practice in its well established home
improvements business involves opening hundreds of stores a year to quickly
penetrate markets and then use operating information and experience to validate its
assumptions and fine tune elements of its strategy for each location. In contrast, for the
new product markets, Home Depot opens just a few stores in a handful of locations to
experiment with various formats and thereby check the various assumptions
mentioned earlier. Once a critical mass of knowledge is accumulated from these
“concept stores”, decision on a national roll out of the strategy is taken. For example, in
entering the home furnishing business, Home Depot sequentially built three concept
stores under the brand name “Expo Design Center” in three different regions of the
country (San Diego in the west coast, Atlanta in the south, and Westbury New York in
the east coast). After experimenting with various concepts in these stores for three
years, Home Depot was ready for a national roll out of its strategy for the home
furnishing business with a decision to open 200 Expo Design Center stores nationwide
in the next thirty months (Halverson, 1998).
Conclusion
This paper developed and illustrated a framework to help design strategy content
controls. Given the rapid globalization of markets and the growing convergence and
change in industries and technologies, firms will increasingly need to move beyond
familiar domains into new markets and develop new capabilities to survive or ride the
Schumpeterian tides of creative destruction (Hamel and Prahalad, 1994; Raynor, 2002).
Such strategies are likely to be based more on assumptions than knowledge and
require firms to cope with more environmental uncertainty than strategies in familiar
businesses in developed country markets. Firms will need to continuously shape such
strategies to reflect their evolving understanding of the new domain and the changing
environment. Consequently, there is an urgent need to develop tools that help
managers shape and control the content of strategies. The framework developed in this
paper represents a beginning in this important endeavor.
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Appendix. Tools for designing strategy implementation controls
The earliest and the most popular model of strategy implementation control, whose development
dates back to early works on scientific management by Henri Fayol and others, is the cybernetic
process (Green and Welsh, 1988). Strategy implementation control designs based on the
cybernetic model involve a three-step process. First, standards of performance necessary to
implement strategy are articulated. Second, actual performance is measured. Third, deviations of
actual performance from standards are used to inform corrective action.
Ouchi (1977) expanded upon the cybernetic model (see also Snell, 1992). In Ouchi’s model, two
types of performance standards can be set – quantitative output standards, and behavioral
norms or standard operating procedures. Actual performance can also be measured either in
terms of quantitative outputs or in terms of monitoring behavior. For those strategic initiatives
where it is possible to articulate output standards and measure actual outputs, the cybernetic
process involving quantitative output standards and measures are recommended. For those
initiatives where setting output standards or measuring actual outputs is a problem, cybernetic
process with behavioral standards and behavior monitoring is recommended. To use the
cybernetic process with behavioral standards and behavior monitoring, however, the
organization must be able to articulate the processes or behavior required for successfully
implementing strategy and monitor conformity with these behavioral expectations. For those
strategic initiatives where neither output based cybernetic process nor behavior based cybernetic
process can be used, Ouchi’s model recommends relying on non-cybernetic processes such as
organization culture and socialization as a way of reducing the need for control.
Kaplan and Norton (1992, 1993, 1996) developed the balanced score card based on the basic
cybernetic model of strategy implementation control. They suggest that it is important to
establish performance standards and measure actual performance in four broad areas -financial,
customers, internal business processes, and learning. Kaplan and Norton (1996) also provide
ideas on how to arrive at performance standards and measures that reflect strategy and how to
link performance standards and measures across various levels of the organization.
The three models for strategy implementation control design reviewed here represent major
categories in the sense that there are many variations and extensions of these three base models
that one can find in the literature.
Strategy content
controls
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